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Chinese Defence Reforms 
and Lessons for India 
D S Rana
Introduction
Since the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China’s 
defence forces have evolved through various stages of modernisation with 
a focus on doctrinal changes, structural reforms, as well as reduction of 
forces. Post Mao era, the first sincere attempt to infuse professionalism 
in the outdated People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commenced in the true 
sense, when ‘national defence’ was made one of the ‘Four Modernisations,’ 
as announced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. This boost towards military 
modernisation was catalysed by the reduced threat perception post 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and greater allocation in the 
defence budget for upgradation post 1995, as boosted by an improved 
Chinese economy.
The display of high-end technology by the US in the Gulf War and 
its outcome forced the Chinese brass for the first time to acknowledge 
the PLA’s shortcomings for future wars, and served as a trigger for the 
present stage of reforms.1 As a result of the assessed “period of strategic 
opportunity” by China in the beginning of the 21st century and the 
consequent Hu Jintao’s new set of “historic missions” for the PLA, 
the concept of ‘the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese 
characteristics’ was enunciated through China’s 2004 National Defence 
White Paper. As a follow-up, the timeline for the modernisation of the 
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PLA was laid out in three steps in the following 2006 White Paper. 
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
in October 2017, as part of acceleration of the military modernisation 
plan, shortened the timeline of the original third step of ‘completion of 
informationisation’ by 15 years from 2049 to 2035—a result of China’s 
perceived emerging complex security environment.
Why Study China’s Military Reforms?
China being the primary adversary, with outstanding boundary claims, 
would be the first argument for an in-depth study into the rapid changes 
in PLA structures and capabilities. On other hand, these reforms based 
on lessons from recent conflicts and best practices of the developed 
world militaries, may also provide valuable lessons for the transformation 
of own armed forces. China’s defence reforms are apt case studies for 
management of change and leapfrogging reforms, based on a long-term 
vision.
Contours of Present Reforms
On November 23, 2015, Xi Jinping announced a new five-year plan of 
PLA reforms, scheduled for completion by the end of 2020. The ongoing 
military reforms are intended to bridge the gap between the PLAs self-
assessed weaknesses, identified as the “two incompatibles,” the “two 
inabilities,” and the “five incapables”, and the expectations of the Party 
and the state.2 The unprecedent reforms can be analysed in two broad 
themes: first, the politics of military reform; and, second, the restructuring 
of the PLA itself to optimise its war-fighting capabilities.
Politics of Reforms
The immediate political goal of military reforms is to enhance Xi’s 
authority to control the gun on behalf of the CPC.3 This very objective 
prompted Xi to assume all three key positions concurrently: President, 
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Party Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman, 
on taking over from Hu in 2012. The abolition of the two-term limit 
of the state presidency in the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) 
in March 2018 has further consolidated Xi’s power. The restructured 
CMC (seven members against the earlier 11) and replacing four erstwhile 
Army dominated powerful General Departments with 15 functional 
departments/offices/commissions has resulted in reinstating the supreme 
authority of the CMC chair. Some major implications of the political 
reforms are as follows:
  The emergence of the CMC chair’s one-man rule emphasises 
Xi’s consolidation, centralisation, and personalisation rather than 
civilian control. The all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee 
(PBSC) members, other than Xi, have limited involvement and say 
in PLA matters. This increased power stature, coupled with the 
anti-corruption campaign, has ensured minimum resistance to Xi’s 
command and reform measures.
  The People’s Armed Police (PAP), including the Border Defence 
(BD) troops deployed on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) are 
now placed under the direct CMC operational and organisational 
command, with no dual control by the State Council. The PLA 
would, thus, be in full control over border affairs which would result 
in better response to CMC directives.
  Xi, as Commander-in Chief, is routinely involved even in operational 
matters. To ensure his firm control, there has been increased political 
and ideological training in the PLA post 2012 which may adversely 
impact the directive style of command required at different levels for 
modern warfare. 
Restructuring the PLA
The restructuring of the PLA could be termed as the second most 
important agenda in the present reform aimed to achieve the stated 
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goal of “complete mechanization and make major progress in 
informationalization” by 2020. With the ‘head’ and ‘body’ of the reforms 
completed, the PLA is presently undergoing the consolidation phase of 
the restructuring. Two major implications, besides creating/upgrading 
new services [PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and PLA Rocket 
Force (PLARF)] and formation of five Theatre Commands, to support 
new concepts of war-fighting, are as follows: 
  A lean combat ready force has been achieved by the reduction of 
three lakh troops, mostly from non-combat areas, with measures like 
termination of the PLA’s profit generation activities, outsourcing 
logistic functions and military education, to name a few. Flab from 
the field force has been trimmed by reducing the Group Armies from 
18 to 13, removing division headquarters, conversion to modular 
forces (brigade equivalent) in all the three Services as also streamlining 
logistic functions. 
  There has been concurrent rebalancing among three Services. The 
Army’s dominance in policy-making structures has been reduced, 
with diluted versions of the erstwhile four powerful departments, 
balanced composition of members in the restructured CMC as well as 
nomination of Theatre Commanders from the Navy (Southern Theatre 
Command—STC) and Air Force (Central Theatre Command—
CTC). Since April 2017, “84 corps-level units” have been established 
in order to instill better interoperability by rebalancing of grades 
between various services and organisations.4
Drivers of Military Reforms
The doctrine evolved out of the military strategy would be the prime driver 
for force structuring and capability development of any country. China’s 
military strategy of “active defense in the new situation” enunciated 
through the 2015 White Paper, besides other aspects, highlights maritime 
orientation.5 The PLA doctrine has evolved through various phases, with 
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the present doctrine of “winning informationalized local wars” since 2015 
being the guiding factor for the ongoing modernisation efforts. The fifth 
generation operational regulations, which would translate doctrine into 
specific guidance for the Services, are long overdue (fourth generation 
published in 1999) and are likely to include aspects like cyber and space.6 
Some other significant drivers for the reforms are given below:
Shift in Foreign Policy
The foreign policy of China has been guided by two well-known slogans. 
The first is tao guang yang hui, usually rendered into English as “hide your 
light and bide your time”, which guided Chinese policy for decades from 
the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping first established it as a principle of caution in 
foreign affairs. In late 2013, though, a new slogan was coined by President Xi 
Jinping to define a more assertive, muscular approach to foreign policy: fen 
fa you wei or, as it is commonly translated, “strive for achievement”.7 This 
drift led to China’s declaration of an air defence identification zone over the 
East China Sea in late 2013, its assertive behaviour in the South China Sea, 
and the beginning of the transformational military reforms. 
Economy
China has maintained 1.2 to 1.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) as the defence budget albeit with the exclusion of many aspects 
like foreign weapons procurements, Research and Development (R&D) 
and certain personnel benefits. As per a recent Brookings Paper on 
‘economic activity’, China has overstated its GDP from 2008-16 by 
as much as 16 per cent.8 In that case, China’s defence spending as a 
percentage of GDP would be over 2 per cent. China’s military spending 
increased by an average 10 per cent (inflation adjusted) per year from 
2000 to 2016 and has gradually slowed to 5 to 7 per cent during 2017-
18.9 The 2019 defence spending increase of 7.5 per cent with the official 
outlay of Yuan 1.19 trillion ($177.49 billion), outpaces the economic 
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growth target of 6.0 to 6.5 per cent.10 China has benefited from the 
“latecomer advantage” and, without investing in R&D, has acquired 
certain new technologies through the direct purchase of platforms from 
foreign militaries, by retrofits or by theft of Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs).11
Science and Technology
China hopes to be a leader of “The Fourth Industrial Revolution” 
with the focus to exploit the exploding number of technological 
breakthroughs in fields as diverse as hypersonic; nanotechnology; high-
performance computing; quantum communications; space systems; 
autonomous systems; artificial intelligence; robotics; high-performance 
turbofan engine design; new, more efficient and powerful forms of 
propulsion; advanced manufacturing processes (including additive 
manufacturing/3-D printing); and advanced aerospace quality materials, 
to name a few. “Made in China 2025”, unveiled in 2015, is the first 
10-year action plan designed to transform China from a manufacturing 
giant into a world manufacturing power and is likely to make it almost 70 
per cent self-sufficient in technology.12 These ambitions have caught the 
attention of the Western world, especially, the US which has repeatedly 
accused China of unfair practices to achieve its targets by ‘leapfrogging’. 
Defence Industries Reforms
The PLA initiated the latest defence-industrial reforms in 2016 and 
these are expected to be implemented by 2020. They are aimed to 
reduce the bureaucracy, develop a more structured R&D apparatus, 
streamline developmental timelines and promote innovation through 
civil-military integration. The aspect of hungai (混改), or Mixed-
Ownership Reform (MOR) is aimed to relieve the state’s financial burden 
by broadening access to capital market financing, and the long-term 
objective is to introduce market forces into the industry. Public-private 
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partnerships manifested through civil-military integration are already 
reaping rich dividends, as when the PLA, in March 2017, declassified 
more than 3,000 dual-use technology patents.13
Intellectual Foundation
One of the significant and often overlooked aspects of the current military 
reforms has been an overhaul of the research and doctrinal development 
system within the PLA. As part of “below-the-neck” reforms which 
commenced some time in 2017, there has been a revision of the Professional 
Military Education (PME) system, with emphasis on joint operations. 
There has been major realignment of the Academy of Military Sciences 
(AMS) along with some changes to the National Defence University 
(NDU) and National University of Defence Technology (NUDT), the 
institutions under the CMC. The AMS which, till now, had the niche 
on doctrinal issues, including publication of Defence White Papers, etc., 
has received fresh Science and Technology (S&T) focus after the recent 
merger of six research institutes, earlier subordinate to the PLA’s former 
General Departments14, within its fold. This is aimed at closer alignment 
of S&T progress with doctrinal development. There have been new 
partnerships with civilian universities and research academies to achieve 
what the PLA refers to as “military-civilian fusion” (军民融合). Military 
educational institutes also contribute to writing joint training scenarios, 
organise training, participate in exercise assessments and evaluations, and 
provide a blue force of experts for the confrontation exercises. These 
changes are already bringing PLA academics and operational commanders 
in close contact, which should improve the quality of both groups.
Concept of ‘System of System’ Warfare and  
Integrated Joint Operations (IJOs) 
Indepth study of the Gulf War (1991) and Kosovo conflict (1999) 
has led the PLA to adopt systems thinking (integrate so that the sum 
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is greater than the parts). China has adapted the US concept of net-
centric warfare and aims to achieve the “information system-based 
system of system operational capability”, and the IJO is the foundation 
to achieve this capability. As per the PLA’s system destruction warfare, 
modern warfare would be a confrontation between opposing 
operational systems [作战体系] rather than merely opposing Armies.15 
The aim would be to paralyse the critical functioning of the opposing 
force by striking key points and nodes through kinetic and non-
kinetic means by employing a more robust, capable, and adaptable 
operational system. These operational systems would be tailor-made 
for specific needs, employing all domains, including cyber, electronic 
warfare, psychological and others. 
The PLA is presently undergoing a transition from coordinated joint 
operations to IJOs with the aim to integrate domains like cyber, electronic 
warfare, psychological and others, till the lower tactical echelons. Some 
of the important concepts associated with the system of system and IJOs, 
as discussed in PLA publications, include precision operations, modular 
forces groupings, information firepower strike, non-contact and non-
linear operations.16 To achieve these capabilities, the PLA has almost 
doubled its integrated training to almost 40 per cent. The ongoing Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) reforms aim to build a more permanent 
technical oriented professional corps, thus, overcome problems arising 
out of the non-permanent nature of the conscription system. The concept 
of the system of system and IJO may seem more aspirational at this stage 
but a degree of these capabilities would be achieved by the end of 2020 
and the PLA hopes to mature the same by 2035, coinciding with the laid 
down milestone of completion of informationalisation. 
Evolved Key Capabilities for War-Fighting: Implications
The PLA has moved a long way from the Mao Zedonga’s era military 
which was ground force-centric and lacked mechanisation. Most of the 
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evolving capabilities and structures in the recent past have been designed 
to achieve information system-based system of system operational and 
IJO capabilities. The implications of these structures and capabilities are 
as follows.
Integrated C4ISR
The development of integrated Command, Control, Communications, 
Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is the 
backbone to achieve IJOs capabilities. Beidou-based integrated command 
platforms have been developed and made available till the tactical levels 
to all combat and support elements, which would provide seamless 
battlefield awareness and connectivity. There is focus on redundancy 
of communication by a combination of Optical Fibre Communication 
(OFC), satellite, combat net radio and establishing a communication grid 
through Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), if required. Major advances 
have been made in developing a very expensive hackproof quantum 
communication. China successfully launched the world’s first quantum-
enabled satellite in August 2016. 
Modular Forces and Brigadisation
As per the PLA concept of system of system, the ‘operational units’ are 
basic ‘plug and play’ modular units which can be rapidly structured to 
form bigger modular combat formations, as per requirement, thereby 
enhancing flexibility.17 Within the ground forces, the combined arms 
battalion and brigade are part of such modular forces. The three 
regiments of the 15th Airborne Corps of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 
is also now reformed into six airborne brigades directly under the 
corps headquarters along with other support brigades.18 The recent 
reorganisation of the PLAAF from 20-25 air regiments to a largely 
brigade structure today (as also the PLA Naval Aviation) makes it a 
more agile and flexible force.19 
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Non-Contact Warfare (NCW)
Some of the likely reasons for China’s enhanced impetus to develop 
NCW capabilities, with the underlying principle of “fighting wars without 
suffering casualties” are lessons from their successful employment 
by the US in Gulf War, China’s self-realisation of its lack of combat 
experience, coupled with the impact of its one-child policy. In order 
to achieve asymmetric advantage, China, over a period, has developed 
these capabilities in both the kinetic and non-kinetic spheres, as described 
below.
Cyber and Electronic Warfare
Chinese writings indicate “information domination” as the prerequisite 
for achieving victory in modern warfare. The PLA could use cyber warfare 
capabilities to support military operations in the early stages of the 
conflict by interfering in the adversary’s mobilisation, targeting networks 
based on Command and Control (C2), C4ISR, logistics and others by 
exploiting extensive data collected by cyber reconnaissance during peace-
time. The enhanced cyber activities would continue as force multipliers 
to the conventional capabilities during a conflict. Centralisation of cyber 
reconnaissance, cyber attack and cyber defence capabilities under the 
PLASSF would enhance the potential of NCW. The dual control of its 
assets at the theatre level also would facilitate war-fighting. The display 
of separate Information Operations Group during the 90th anniversary 
parade at Zhurihe in 2017 suggests the PLA’s increasing priority to 
control the complex electromagnetic environment.20
Space and Counter-Space
China gradually realised the importance of ‘space’ when, in 2013, it become 
an independent and essential domain of modern warfare. All space-based 
programmes have been historically managed by the PLA, which, post 
current reorganisation, have become part of the Space Division of the 
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PLASSF. China’s strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems 
and deny them to adversaries as central to enabling modern informatised 
warfare.21 Post 2020, with a “high-resolution Earth Observation system” 
in place, China would achieve almost real-time Intelligence Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.22 The BeiDou Navigation Satellite 
System (BDS) would achieve a global network by 2020, with higher 
grade accuracy for the military (navigation, guidance of missiles/weapon 
system).23 In order to gain asymmetric advantage over the US (whose 
communication, ISR and navigation is mostly space-based), China’s 
focus over the next decade would be the development of counter-
space capabilities. Some of these existing Chinese capabilities include 
direct ascent Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons, co-orbital systems like the 
Aolong-1 and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) which allegedly have 
been used in the past to blind US satellites.24 
Unmanned Systems
As part of the advanced weapon systems programmes, China’s unmanned 
system is the most rapid growing sector, being a low cost, safe, less 
escalatory and very versatile option.25 While China has made some 
progress on the Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and Unmanned 
Surface Vehicles (USVs), maximum expansion has been in UAVs and 
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) with almost 140 variants 
being presently operated by the PLA. Chinese armed drones (UCAVs) 
have been operated or ordered by 17 [mostly Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI)] countries, with Pakistan producing a licensed version of the 
Wing Loong II model.26 China set a world record in December 2017 
when it succeeded in showcasing collective orchestration of over 1,000 
miniature drones.27 While presently, Chinese UAV models may lack in 
detection capabilities and overall endurance, when compared to US 
models, the ranges (with data link from Beidou) and payload capabilities 
are increasing.
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Precision Strikes
A key part of China’s PLARF arsenal is a large force of approximately 
1,200 conventionally armed variety of Short Range Ballastic Missiles 
(SRBMs).28 China is also fielding conventional Medium Range Ballistic 
Missiles (MRBMs) like the manoeuvrable warheads with higher accuracy 
DF 21D (1,500 km range) and DF 16 G missiles to conduct precision 
strikes against land as also aircraft carriers.29 The CJ 10 ground launched 
cruise missile (ranges over 1,500 km), along with similar air launched 
land attack cruise missiles, offers flight paths different from the SRBMs, 
enhancing targeting options and flexibility. In addition, the PLA Ground 
Forces have in recent years acquired artillery rockets comparable in range 
to the SRBMs and may be acquiring tactical-range cruise missiles.30 
Implications of NCW
In any future war, China is likely to have a protracted Network-Centric 
Warfare (NCW) phase prior to the contact phase. The “Three Warfares 
Strategy” adopted by the CMC in 2003, involving psychological warfare, 
public opinion warfare, and legal warfare, would be effective months and 
even years before the war. Now, with the PLASSF increasingly participating 
in all field joint exercises including ‘Stride,’ there would be greater impact 
of NCW in all stages of the battle.31 The real-time ISR capability, coupled 
with improved Circular Error Probable (CEPs) of its SRBMs would 
translate into a precise and effective kinetic targeting of own operational 
assets and Vital Areas/Vital Points (VAs/VPs). The vertical Take-Off and 
Landing (VTOL) UAV, the AV 500 W, capable of carrying air-to-ground 
missiles, participated in the PLA exercise in Tibet in September 2018.32 
When deployed along the Sino-India border, these would pose additional 
challenges of detection and interception. The demonstrated smart, self-
healing swarm drones can saturate enemy defences and undertake operations 
like Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) very effectively. China 
considers its most innovative network warfare capability, including cyber 
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weapons, as ‘single use resources’ and would reveal them only to attain 
major strategic objective at the appropriate time.33
Pockets for Excellence (POE) for War-Fighting
The contours of the present modernisation and structures suggest that 
in the future, China would avoid attrition warfare. The concept would 
involve prolonged NCW, as described earlier, followed by the land 
campaign with more reliance on third dimensions (vertical envelopment) 
along multiple thrust lines. The POEs developed in the realm of ground 
forces to support this concept are as follows.
Special Operation Force (SOF)
One SOF or Special Operation Brigade is now grouped with each 
reorganised Group Army (GA)/Combined Corps (CC), including 
Xinjiang Military District (XMD) and Tibet Military District (TMD).34 
These forces in the Western Theatre Command (WTC), mostly co-
located and training with aviation assets, are now equipped with the latest 
equipment like the QTS 11, an advanced integrated individual soldier 
combat system and, thus, would have a significant force multiplier effect 
at the tactical and operational levels.35
Air Assault Brigades
The Air Assault Brigades, formed by the merging of the motorised 
infantry division and aviation assets, were first displayed in air assault 
demonstration in 2017, at Zhurihe during the 90th anniversary military 
parade to mark the founding of the PLA. The air assault simulated the 
integration of reconnaissance, attack, and transport helicopters with 
infantry to secure a remote landing zone.36 Currently, there is one air 
assault brigade each in 75CC/ STC and 83CC/CTC and more are likely 
to be raised.37 These could well be utilised for coup-de-main operations 
against unheld areas on the Sino-India borders. 
D S RANA
CLAWS Journal l Summer 2019 151
Aviation
Army Aviation as one of the “new-type combat forces” has been rapidly 
expanding, especially after 2015, with the PLA receiving its 1,000th 
helicopter in 2016.38 Presently, the PLA Army Aviation comprises 13 
brigades, one aviation brigade per CC (except 75 and 88, which have 
air assault brigade each), XMD and TMD.39 Aviation is modernising 
quantitively as well as qualitatively, with the induction of the latest 
helicopters, including the WZ 10 attack helicopter, and the Z18, Z 8G, 
Z 20 transport version replacing the old MI 171, S 70, and aiming to 
achieve all-weather day or night capability.40 The combined SOF and 
aviation expansion in the WTC, with increased helicopter bases close to 
the Sino-India border, provide increased heliborne capabilities thereby, 
altering the threat perception.
Force Projection and its Manifestation in IOR
The PLA Navy (PLAN) is gradually acquiring blue water capabilities 
aligned to its fresh orientation of ‘offshore water defence with open sea 
protection’, as highlighted in the 2015 White Paper. It is likely to operate 
three aircraft carriers by 2022. The PLAN is also rapidly expanding the 
Marines with presently seven battalions, has launched four of the planned 
eight world’s largest Type 55 destroyers (displacement over 10,000 
tons), capable of independent blue water deployments.41 With five Type 
71 Landing Platform Docks (LPDs), each capable of carrying a battalion 
group, and the under construction 35,000 tons displacement Type 75 
LPDs, it would provide sizeable amphibious capabilities. 
Since 2008, as part of naval diplomacy, China has sent 30 Anti-Piracy 
Task Forces in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), generally comprising 
two battleships and a supply ship.42 Regular naval exercises with foreign 
countries, especially Russia, have provided the necessary nuances of 
blue water operations. In addition, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)has 
incrementally improved its power projection capabilities with frequent 
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exercises beyond the first island chain involving H-6K bombers equipped 
with the CJ-20 Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). Strategic lift is on 
the rise with increased induction of the Y-20 transport aircraft and the 
ongoing joint production of the world’s largest transport aircraft (An-
225) with Ukraine.43 There are many reports of Chinese submarines’ 
forays in the Indian Ocean, including nuclear ones (SSNs). With these 
developments, the PLAN is likely to be capable of undertaking meaningful 
combat manifestation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) by 2025.
Logistics for IJO
The PLA considers joint logistics an important foundation for its emerging 
IJO capability. A Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) was established in 
September 2016, with one central logistic base at Wuhan and five logistic 
centres in each Theatre Command. An integrated C4ISR, along with 
the Bediou-based Integrated Command Platform (providing real-time 
status) would provide the foundation to the Just in Time (JIT) responsive 
logistic framework. There is provision for a tailor-made contingency 
logistic support brigade to support the ‘system of system’ confrontation 
warfare.44
Lessons for India
Aligning Defence Modernisation with Political Vision
India is possibly the only democratic country where civilian control over 
the military is exercised by the bureaucracy rather than the political class. 
The experiences of the PLA and other developed militaries indicate that 
no transformative reform is possible without the direct involvement of the 
apex political leadership. In the absence of the required transformational 
changes, an empowered Defence Planning Committee (DPC) was 
established in April 2018, under the chairmanship of the National Security 
Adviser (NSA). While the DPC, headed by a political appointee, would play 
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an important role to bridge a key gap in the existing integrated capability 
building, it doesn’t replace the ultimate need of an institutionalised CDS/
permanent Chairman Chief of Staff Committee (COSC). As, in the case 
of China, aligning defence modernisation goals with the national vision 
would also provide the required impetus to defence modernisation.
Integrated Theatre Commands
In the present set-up, the Indian armed forces are organised in 18 
Commands excluding the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). In the 
event of hostilities with India, China would employ the Western Theatre 
Command (WTC) on the land borders and the Southern Theatre 
Command (STC) with the South China Sea fleet component at sea. In 
contrast, eight Indian operational commands (from the Indian Army and 
Indian Air Force) would be involved on land, and for the maritime domain, 
the Navy’s Eastern Command and Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar 
Theatre Command would also come into play, which incidentally report 
to the rotational Chairman COSC. There is no gainsaying the fact that 
in the absence of both a CDS/permanent COSC and a Joint Operations 
Directorate, there would be total lack of coordination which would 
adversely impact the operational effectiveness. Learning from China’s 
approach and specific Indian conditions, it is recommended that the 
undermentioned actions be undertaken as a precursor to implementing 
the proposed unified structure in the Indian armed forces.
  Synchronise the boundaries of different operational commands of the 
three Services, in the same theatre of war. Wherever possible, the 
headquarters of these commands to be co-located, with cross-posting 
of staff officers from the three Services up to the division levels and 
equivalent. These steps would instill better coordination.
  In 2018, China had brought all its border defence formations directly 
under the CMC with no dual control by the state which would make 
them more responsive to the PLA in all contingencies. Similarly, 
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the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) deployed on the northern 
borders needs to be under the Army’s operational control for greater 
operational synergy and optimal utilisation of resources. 
  Appoint a Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, as 
recommended by the Naresh Chandra Task Force in 2013. Besides 
the tri-Service institutions presently under the CISC, he should 
command future Integrated Functional Commands (Space, Cyber, 
Special Forces). He may also be mandated to integrate logistics, 
training and such functions in a time-bound manner and undertake 
pilot studies for further integration.
Integration for Jointness
The reservations amongst the various stakeholders in India have resulted 
in the less than optimum level of jointness required to address the threat 
arising from the reformed armed forces of China in the near future. There 
is a need to combine the top down and bottom up approach to achieve 
gradual ‘integration’ of various functions which will act as a catalyst and 
ultimately lead to the desired end state of ‘jointness’. While functions like 
communication between the Services have achieved a fair level of integration, 
the following aspects/areas which possibly can be integrated are as under. 
Logistics
The logistics chain of various operational commands of the different 
Services can be integrated after some restructuring. Learning from 
China’s experiment, initially, only common or general logistics may be 
integrated while retaining separate Service specific requirements.
Professional Military Education (PME)
Knowledge integration of commanders with common procedures and 
staff work between the Services would be an inescapable necessity for 
future wars. In order to implement cross-posting of staff officers, as 
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recommended above, joint training of staff officers by integrating our 
training institutions like the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) 
(same course curriculum) and co-locating the Higher Command (HC) 
and equivalent courses from the three Services need to be instituted as 
a first step. India may explore China’s experience as part of civil-military 
integration and that of the US since the 1990s, wherein more and more 
civilians are being inducted as faculty members in military academic 
institutions. This, along with allocating training slots in joint Services 
training institutions for the bureaucrats handling defence matters in the 
Ministry of Defence, would also enhance civil-military integration. 
Training
More focus is required on joint planning rather than merely joint 
operations during training. More integrated training is the need of the 
hour, with participation of not only Service platforms but also aspects 
like cyber, space, information warfare in realistic settings, down to tactical 
levels. Existing Service specific training areas, with a scale of at least 
one per Army Command should be gradually converted to Integrated 
Training Bases (ITBs) as enabling infrastructure. Employing a state-of-
the-art enemy force combined with simulation techniques could help 
in evolving more efficient procedures and tactics. All outcomes of war-
games and exercises need to be retained as data base for feeding in the 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) enabled national level joint simulation centre 
which is recommended to be established in the near future. 
Doctrine and Strategy
China has been publishing Defence White Papers since 1998, with the 
2015 White Paper on “Chinese Military Strategy,” being the ninth in the 
order. India published the first unclassified Joint Armed Forces Doctrine 
in 2017 despite the absence of any formal National Security Strategy 
and National Military Strategy. For these reasons, the doctrine may not 
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be perfect, nevertheless, it provides a window into the beginning of a 
formal articulation of India’s guiding strategic thought. In the past, India 
has come out with various informal limited war doctrines addressing the 
western adversary, like “cold start doctrine” to sub-conventional, covert 
action (informally called “hot pursuit” or “surgical strike”), with some 
degree of success on the intended impact. There is a need to articulate 
an appropriate doctrine for the northern front to bridge the increasing 
gap in military capabilities. As an example, there is possibly a rethinking 
on the “no first use” nuclear policy within China in certain conditions 
considering its powerful adversary (US).45 Similar reconsideration by 
India may also be debated to enhance our deterrence.
Defence Industry Reforms
India’s defence industry has gained traction with the government’s policy 
changes and reforms such as streamlining of the Defence Procurement 
Procedure (DPP 2016) and changes in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
regulations from 26 to 49 per cent. Despite the above steps and unrolling 
of the Strategic Partnership Policy (SPP) to create capacity in the private 
sector, the process remains complex, with limited flow of FDI and less than 
optimum utility of the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). 
India could gainfully utilise China’s reforms experiences wherein the State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are benefiting from civil-military integration 
in the fields of R&D (dual use patents) and more cost-effective practices. 
It would go a long way to create an efficient ecology by establishing widely 
distributed “science cities”, industrial parks, and high-tech zones near our 
defence-industrial corporations. This would also facilitate absorption of 
disruptive technology in which there is substantial expertise available in 
Indian private industries, like AI, nano technology, robotics, and others 
for military purpose. India may also reduce the state’s financial burden in 
its state enterprises by broadening access to capital market financing from 
issuing bonds and equity, as now being done in China.
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Domination of IOR
With China’s threat of manifestation in the IOR looming large in the 
foreseeable future, India may draw valuable lessons from China’s Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy against the US military intervention 
in its immediate areas of concern. India should maintain its focus on 
deepening security cooperation with regional partners to ensure the 
effectiveness of its radar initiative as part of an ambitious project to build a 
maritime domain awareness network across the Indian Ocean.46 It would be 
prudent to further expand the strategic reach of the Andaman and Nicobar 
(A&N) Islands. The strategically located Lakshadweep Islands, which 
also comprise a natural unsinkable aircraft carrier, like the A&N Islands, 
could be developed and converted into another Tri-Service Command, 
along with the Southern Naval Command in Kochi.47 Taking a clue from 
China’s ‘underwater great wall’ project, India too could deploy sensors on 
the bottlenecks of the Straits of Ombai Wetar and Lombak, from where 
Chinese submarines could enter the IOR, submerged and undetected. 
Gradually enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the South 
China Sea would provide the required leverage to the Indian Navy.
Increase Interaction with PLA Institutions
The PLA plays an important role in China’s foreign and security policies, 
be it relations with neighbours or its interests overseas. Therefore, it is 
necessary that the Indian establishment deepen its contacts with PLA 
academies and institutions. Indian think-tanks can play a role in this 
regard.48 The National Defence College (NDC), Higher Command (HC) 
and equivalent courses should regularly visit China as part of foreign study 
tours. Similarly, more training courses at various training institutions may 
be allotted for the PLA in India on a reciprocal bases. The frequency of 
joint exercises like ‘Hand in Hand’ needs to increase. These interactions 
would provide insight into China’s perspective on various issues and the 
future contours and challenges of its defence reforms.
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Operational Concept
PLA modernisation is primarily aimed against a superior adversary (the 
US) and the application of its new force structure based on mechanisation 
gives it an edge in some areas in eastern Ladakh and northern Sikkim 
opposite India.49 Indian military’s operational concepts need to be tailored 
to the nature of the terrain which imposes mostly attrition warfare beyond 
the crust of the Tibetan plateau, and assessing the Chinese military threat 
post reorganisation in view of the increased special forces, aviation and 
NCW capabilities. In accordance with its doctrine on frontier defence, 
China does not follow the concept of ground holding and most of its 
conventional forces are in the interior—to be surged in times of crisis, 
supported by a well-developed infrastructure. With China’s focus on 
border development, many more valuable objectives have emerged closer 
to the LAC.
Operational Structures and Capabilities
Cyber and Space
China has integrated cyber and space under the PLASSF which is 
directly under the CMC. In India, the diluted versions of integrated 
functional commands in the form of the Defence Cyber Agency and 
Defence Space Agency may be a good beginning but are short of 
the desired level of integration. For example, post reorganisation, 
the cyber aspects for critical and non-critical infrastructure would be 
the responsibility of the National Technical Research Organisation 
(NTRO) and Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology 
(MEITY) respectively, with separate defence cyber agencies for the 
different Services. Thus, the structures are still in compartments, and 
functioning through coordination without integrating has its pitfalls 
and needs to be factored for further reforms.
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Approaches to Develop C4ISR Capabilities
To bridge rapidly growing gap with China in space and ISR capability, 
a separate focussed well-articulated military space programme is 
needed to develop indigenous space and counter-space capabilities. 
India would need many more satellites in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
[both Earth Observation (EO) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)] 
with better resolution to match the almost real-time revisit that China 
is likely to achieve by 2020. To cater for redundancy and counter-space 
weapons, India needs to develop capabilities to launch LEO satellites 
on demand. India’s latest test of ASAT weapon capability on March 
27, 2019, is indeed a strategic achievement. Enhanced focus on UAVs 
and other platforms for Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) is needed 
for the northern borders. India should fully the utilise provisions 
of COMCASA, or Communications Compatibility and Security 
Agreement signed with the US in September 2018, for intelligence 
sharing, including real-time imagery. India needs to undertake a 
pilot study for harnessing the power of research in AI and Internet of 
Things (IoT) in the private sector to develop an efficient model for 
network-centric warfare capabilities.
Adapting to Non-Contact Warfare
On priority, India should invest in, or acquire, advanced UAVs (including 
UCAVs) and counter UAV technology against China’s significant 
expansion of similar capabilities. India’s BrahMos supersonic cruise 
terrain hugging missile, with steep dive capabilities, is most difficult 
to intercept.50 Increased production and further modifications to the 
BrahMos missile (including a hypersonic version) which is already capable 
of being launched from the sea, land, and air would be an apt response 
to China’s precision strike capabilities. Induction of such an indigenous 
system in good numbers could again be a very cost-effective solution to 
bridge the SRBM gap with China. 
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India needs to gradually develop the indigenous and secure Indian 
Regional Navigation System (IRNSS) receiver chips for all our long-
range vectors. Creating redundancies in command and control structures 
and communications, forward logistics, ability to fight when cutoff, 
maintaining conventional methods of operations without over-reliance 
on satellite-based utilities (for example, artillery shoots) would be some of 
the war-fighting methods to adapt in the NCW setting. China’s enhanced 
SRBM capabilities may necessitate more dispersal of own Air Force assets 
and the need to acquire advance technology for a more effective Runway 
Rehabilitation Scheme (RRS). There is also a need to acquire more 
precision strike standoff armour piercing munitions by the Air Force in 
view of the increased mechanisation of the PLA.
Asymmetric Strategic Capabilities
With China’s official military budget three times that of India, it wouldn’t 
be prudent to match China’s defence capabilities strength with strength. 
Till India achieves such capability, an indirect approach may be the 
preferred option to deter China. China’s famous book “Unrestricted 
Warfare” written by two Chinese Colonels in 1999 had advocated how 
China can defeat a technologically superior opponent (such as the United 
States) through a variety of means including “military and non-military” 
and with “no rules, with nothing forbidden”. China has demonstrated the 
same with its regional competitor, India, by creating Pakistan as its proxy, 
and continues to block Masood Azhar being designated as a terrorist 
even post Pulwama attack, while it considers the Dalai Lama as a radical 
separatist. India needs to consider the option of supporting the Tibetan 
cause, engage with the youth there who may be used as a strategic asset 
in case China escalates the situation along the borders. To cater for such 
a situation, India needs to plan for, and be involved in evolving, a post 
Dalai Lama scenario. At the same time, India should monitor resumption 
of secret talks after a long gap between the Dalai Lama’s representative 
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and Chinese United Front Works Department (UFWD) and the source 
of increased funding of monasteries along the Sino-India border. Taking a 
cue from the imperial era practice, China could even be using the powerful 
Tibetan cultural connectivity for expanding its influence across the Indian 
Himalayan belt, Mongolia and Russia.51 Thus, blindly playing the ‘Dalai 
Lama card’ may be a simplistic approach. The ongoing initiative under 
the Border Area Development Plan (BADP) along the Sino-India border 
would arrest the migration of locals from these remote areas. 
Exploitation of PLA Grey Areas in Reforms 
India’s own defences should to be organised in the classic mountain 
warfare format to force the PLA to fight attrition warfare which it is 
presently not equipped to do. This is due to the PLA’s over-reliance 
on mechanisation, lack of real combat experience since 1979 and likely 
reduced foot infantry post the reforms. The holding units should train 
and equip one-fourth of their strength to operate in small teams akin to 
the Ghatak platoon for standoff fire assaults, act as stay behind parties, 
and prevent the main defences being cut off and bypassed. 
Considering the rugged terrain and not so developed infrastructure, 
there needs to be more reliance on a reactive, distributed and mobile force 
structure, in tandem with scouts, based on the sons of the soil concept, 
dovetailed in the overall conventional defensive framework. Increased 
employment of long range anti-tank weapons in selected areas in eastern 
Ladakh and north Sikkim will prove effective against mechanised thrust 
lines in narrow mobility corridors. Heliborne insertions by enhanced 
aviation assets and SOF in the WTC, including employment of air 
assault formations have their limitations in high altitude areas due to 
the reduced carrying capabilities of helicopters, necessitating large trails 
through valleys. Such attempts could be thwarted by deploying more 
mobile Air Defence (AD) resources [Man-Portable Air Defence System 
(MANPADS)] along the valleys. 
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Conclusion
China’s recent military reforms are transformational in nature, which would 
bring China’s hard power to the next level post 2020. Its growing footprint 
in South Asia and the extended IOR, along with collusion with Pakistan, has 
added to India’s security concerns. There is a variance in the ways to deal 
with these existing challenges: while the larger political dialogue emphasises 
cooperation and restrains competition, there is, nonetheless, a growing 
awareness that India needs to develop reliable and effective hard power as a 
dissuasive strategy against China. It may not be possible at this stage for India 
to compete with China in defence spending, but it is extremely prudent to 
fully optimise and integrate its limited resources. To achieve the same, India 
needs to take concrete steps to develop its hard power by transformative 
reforms in the defence structures at all levels, in a time-bound manner.
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